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our psychoanalytic imaginary. The Budapest model confronts us with a number of crucial 
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as a form of “double dreaming” or of “dreaming up of a dream”. In particular, in drawing on the 
writings of Sándor Ferenczi and Michael Balint, I point to some principles behind the Budapest 
model and to the epistemic, technical, and ethical implications of their ideas. I also work toward a 
Ferenczian “translation” of the idea of “parallel process”. 
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How we remember and evoke, in our times, the practices and habits that belonged to other 
psychoanalytic times and places, is no small matter. This remembrance of other practices is hardly 
just a matter of keeping an “accurate” historical record, where past psychoanalytic modes of doing 
and thinking are stored. It is of direct consequence to our contemporary psychoanalytic imaginary 
and to what we come to conceive as possible in our field. The question I engage in this paper is 
what we might gain in terms of the psychoanalytic imaginary of supervision by a close 
investigation of the problem of the Budapest model of supervision. The Budapest model is not a 
“fossil” in a “museum” of long-disappeared psychoanalytic practices. Instead, it confronts us with 
a number of questions of crucial relevance for contemporary psychoanalysis, including the 
question of envisaging ways of working on the countertransference of the analyst to their patient. 
I also discuss the forgetfulness, and even secrecy, that often surrounds the Budapest model of 
supervision, and I read it as a form of defense in relation to the unsettling issues that this 




In what follows, I reconstruct the conditions of forgetting the creativities of the Budapest 
School of psychoanalysis and its tradition on supervision. In the Budapest model, the first training 
case was supervised by one’s own analyst. As I show, far from marking a lack of reflexivity on 
the dangers that this practice bears in relation to transforming the candidate’s analyst into a figure 
of hyper-authority, this model was developed as a good-enough solution to the problem of placing 
countertransference at the center of the psychoanalytic dispositif and at the center of the 
transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge. In so doing, my aim is not to “revive” the practice, as 
such, that the Budapest School model of supervision brings into focus. Instead, I outline the 
structure of questions that grow out of investigating the practice, and that have a transversal echo, 
cutting across different psychoanalytic schools, orientations, and geographic locations. One such 
question is: what is an adequate “place” for working systematically on the analyst’s 
countertransference to their patient? I argue that remembering the Budapest School confronts us 
with the extreme difficulty of this question and with the fact that no other model of supervision to 
date has found an entirely satisfactory answer to it.  
In the 1920s, something at the heart of psychoanalytic reflection on supervision was lost, 
never to be found again. The entire dispositif of supervision was formed around this fundamental 
loss. With the exclusion of the practices of the Budapest model, the challenging questions it asked 
were excluded as well. What we are left with is an impoverished story that marks the confrontation 
between two traditions, the Berlin model and the Budapest model, where the Berlin model 
prevailed, while the Budapest model was cast out. In the 1940s and 1950s, Michael Balint (1948, 
1954) made an important incision into this simplifying story and evoked the controversies and 
unresolved issues that characterized the 1920s. While this was a resonant intervention, it arguably 
 
 3 
did not manage to alter the main narrative, which treats the Budapest model of supervision as an 
exotic and even dangerous collection of practices that we have now successfully overcome.  
In the past decade, some voices have revived the memory of the Budapest model of 
supervision (Szőnyi, 2014; Bacal, 2016) and have pointed to the internal diversity of the practices 
that are subsumed under this tradition, and to the importance of adding some more colors to the 
image we hold of those early supervision times. One of our main sources of insight into the 
Budapest model is Vilma Kovács’s ground-breaking article on “Training- and Control-Analysis,” 
written in 1936. In the past two decades, the reflection on countertransference in the frame of 
supervision has itself known a revival, especially in the writing of authors of the intersubjective 
tradition, but not restricted to them (Berman, 2000, 2014; Leader, 2010; Yerushalmi, 2012, 2018). 
What I propose in these pages is to draw these two threads together, and to give an account of the 
spirit and principles behind the Budapest School peculiarity of having one’s own analyst also 
serving the function of one of the supervisors of a training case.  
In so doing, I draw on the writings of Sándor Ferenczi and Michael Balint and point to the 
epistemic (what is psychoanalytic knowledge?), technical (through which dispositifs is 
psychoanalytic knowledge transmitted?), and ethical (what is the position of the psychoanalyst in 
relation to knowledge and authority?) implications of their ideas, in relation to supervision. The 
guiding image, which I place at the heart of the present investigation (and at the heart of the 
Budapest School of psychoanalysis) is that of transference and countertransference as a single 
system (Haynal, 1999).2 Ultimately, I discern some Ferenczian principles for supervision, and I tie 
them into the contemporary debates, especially by working towards a Ferenczian “translation” of 
the idea of “parallel process” (Arlow, 1963; Searles, 1955; Doehrman, 1976) in supervision.  
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Let us return for now to our difficult question: why remember Budapest? And also: of what 
nature is the forgetfulness that began in the 1920s, and continues to our days? The first reason for 
this forgetting has to do with the difficulties of psychoanalysis in telling its own history in terms 
of traumas and splits, both internal and external, to the field of psychoanalysis. In their essay “Why 
Psychoanalysis Has No History”, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl and Murray Schwartz (2012) comment 
on a regression of psychoanalytic history-writing into biographic writing, memorializing, or 
criticizing Freud. What is creating this proliferation of fragmented stories is the fact of not 
acknowledging the trauma history of psychoanalysis (Soreanu, 2019). The trauma relates in 
important ways to the different waves of migration of psychoanalysts before and during the First 
and Second World Wars, mostly to England and to the Americas, and to its deep consequences in 
terms of dislocation and communal fragmentation (Young-Bruehl and Schwartz, 2012, p. 140). 
What is missing, for Young-Bruehl and Schwartz, is a collective historical consciousness that can 
organize a set of disparate observations precisely as a trauma history, a reflection on “a repetitive 
pattern of splits and consequent distortions” (Young-Bruehl and Schwartz, 2012, p. 142). In other 
words, it is deeply political to insist on tackling the traumatic residues resulting from both historical 
events and from intellectual splits, quarrels, and fragmentations internal to the field of 
psychoanalysis. We can say that there is a flaw in telling psychoanalytic histories, which 
externalizes traumas, rather than treating them as internal and constitutive of our current state of 
practice and debate.  
The second reason is closely related to the first one and refers to the kind of “object of 
memory” Sándor Ferenczi himself is in psychoanalysis. As we know, Ferenczi and Freud 
exchanged more than a thousand letters (see Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914; 1914-1919; and 1920-
1933). The theoretical labor that took place in the pages of this correspondence marks 
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psychoanalysis to this day. In 1933, there was an important split between the two. As many writers 
have shown (Bergmann, 1996; Haynal, 1997; Schneider, 1988), this split had traumatic 
consequences in psychoanalysis and led to a forgetfulness around Ferenczi’s contributions to 
psychoanalytic theory and technique that lasted for decades. In The Basic Fault, Michael Balint 
himself spoke of the magnitude of the consequences of the split between Freud and Ferenczi: “The 
historic event of the disagreement between Freud and Ferenczi […] acted as a trauma on the 
psychoanalytic world” (Balint, 1968, p. 152). In the past two decades, we have seen a “Ferenczi 
revival” (Harris & Kuchuck, 2015) with a growing interest in his work and complex legacies. The 
way the Budapest model of supervision is remembered (or forgotten) is tied in a significant manner 
to Ferenczi’s figure and this traumatic forgetting.  
The third reason is equally complicated, and it has to do with the mode of 
institutionalization of psychoanalysis, and with some of its defenses against accepting plural 
psychoanalytic modes of knowledge transmission and training. As Szőnyi (2014, p. 608) writes, 
linking the atmosphere of silence and even secrecy around the Budapest model with the early 
processes of institutionalization of psychoanalysis,  
the fate of the Budapest model was total silence, internationally and in Hungary as 
well. I think that the international silence, which covered the whole training, 
especially the controversies on supervision [...] originated in the weakness of the 
organization of the time, which could not bear open debates on decisions achieved 
with difficulties. 
 
This resonates with Michael Balint’s (1948) argument in his important contribution “On the 
Psycho-Analytic Training System”, where he reads the Berlin model as a defense against the 
particular modes of suffering caused to the first generations of analysts by the lack of structure of 
the years preceding 1920. In other words, the Berlin system was a move from almost no formal 
organization to a hyper-organization of the training. 
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What we refer to as “the tri-partite model”, “the Berlin model” or “the Eitingon model” of 
psychoanalytic training, consisting of theoretical courses, personal analysis, and clinical 
supervision, was introduced at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute in the early 1920s and was later 
accepted by most other training centers. Ferenczi expressed his objections in relation to the strict 
separation of the candidate’s analysis from the work of supervision, as he thought that it would 
limit the student’s “opportunity for continuous development through various methods of teaching” 
(Fleming & Benedek, 1966, p. 12). 
Where did Ferenczi’s idea of a more plural method of training come from? It is possible to 
infer that it was anchored in the practices that were already established in the Budapest milieu. As 
early as 1915, Ferenczi was already hoping for the opening of a psychoanalytic social clinic, that 
could give access to treatment to those who could not afford it. After a sustained struggle in the 
dire political times of Horthy’s regime, the Budapest Polyclinic opened its doors in December 
1931. With the clinic, Friday meetings became regular, and they brought together Sándor Ferenczi, 
Alice and Michael Balint, Vilma Kovács, and also Endre Almássy, Robert Bak, Lilly Hajdu, Imre 
Hermann, István Hollós, Kata Lévy, Edit Ludowyk-Gyömröi, Sigmund Pfeiffer, Géza Róheim, 
and Lilian Rotter. Senior analysts gave lectures, and they were followed by a seminar in 
psychoanalytic technique, led by Vilma Kovács (Soreanu, 2019).  
Here, cases were presented and discussions on countertransference were given a key place. 
It is also here that the particularities of the Hungarian training system stabilized, making the 
analysis of the countertransference of the analyst to their patient an essential part of psychoanalytic 
training. This is discussed in 1936 by Vilma Kovács (1936) in her paper on training and control 
analysis. In the Hungarian training system, the first case was supervised by the training analyst 
themselves, which allowed the emergence of a designated analytic place—indeed, not an 
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uncomplicated one—for working primarily on the countertransference of the trainee to their 
patient, and only secondarily on their technical skill. Although transference and 
countertransference were conceived of as a system, where one element could never be fully 
extricated from the other, it was important to find the most suitable arenas and arrangements for 
the labor with countertransference. Hungarian analysts believed that only one’s analyst is in the 
position to develop the sensitive knowledge needed for judging the candidate’s character, their 
conflicts, and their modes of reaction, so as to allow sufficient work on the countertransference to 
take place.  
Let us imagine what this model entailed. Although it was not always the case (Szőnyi, 
2014, pp. 606–607), it was possible for supervision to take place while the analyst was lying down 
on the psychoanalytic couch. The analyst, therefore, was in the dreamer’s position. While lying on 
the couch, they were “dreaming up” the patient, in the presence of their supervisor/analyst. Free-
association was thus “structurally” written into the situation. By “not moving place” from the 
couch, or, rather, by finding themselves on the same couch at a different time, the analyst’s 
unconscious was “spoken to” via the arrangements of the dispositif of supervision, and their hoped-
for “response” was one where they could mobilize to an equal extent conscious and unconscious 
processes in the work of supervision.  
It is important to disentangle a particular “knot” here, by evoking the discussions on the 
institutionalization of training, which took place in the international meetings of the 20s, 30s and 
40s. It is a misconception that the discussions were a kind of competition between two “models” 
—the Budapest and the Berlin—where the Budapest model was discarded for its inappropriate 




It was agreed that to the analysis of the student's reactions to his patient's 
transference more importance should be given […], but at the same time it was 
stressed that teaching of analytical technique exemplified on the material of the 
candidate's supervised cases was equally important. To emphasize the difference 
between the two tasks, the one (analysis of the candidate's counter-transference to 
his patient) was called “Kontrollanalyse” the other (teaching the student how to 
analyse a patient presenting different problems from his, the student's, own) was 
called “Analysenkontrolle”. It soon became clear that for conducting 
“Kontrollanalyse” the training analyst was the most suitable person and conversely 
for the “Analysenkontrolle” he was not. (Balint, 1948, p. 166). 
 
In other words, while there was widespread agreement with the principle of the Budapest 
training system, there was no practical follow-up in terms of the formalization of training. This 
“place” for work on countertransference remained an ideal. My point here is not so much to 
champion the Hungarian system, but to point to the fact that in the past nearly eighty years there 
has been an arrest in the psychoanalytic imagination on training, and an inhibition to organize any 
sort of revision to it. Balint opened his 1954 paper on training with the following sentence: “The 
greatest mistake we could make would be to consider our present training system as a final, or 
even settled, solution of our many problems” (Balint, 1954, p. 157). And he added: “semper 
reformari debet – [...] ‘reform, unremittingly’.” (Balint, 1954, p. 162).   
What is of interest here is Balint’s insistence on dreaming up more spaces where 
countertransference can be addressed. This is his Budapest legacy. Alice and Michael Balint 
(1939) argue that in teaching candidates how to conduct an analysis, we cannot ignore an 
omnipresent “variable’: who the analyst is. The second “variable” of equal importance is the 
psychoanalytic dyad and its singular functioning, including the vicissitudes of this functioning: 
“the analytical situation is the result of an interplay between the patient’s transference and the 
analyst’s counter-transference, complicated by the reactions released in each by the other’s 
transference on to him” (Balint & Balint, 1939, p. 227).  
 
 9 
We are already in the position to orchestrate a few de-exoticizing interventions in relation 
to the Budapest model of supervision. The first one relates to seeing it in its internal heterogeneity 
(Szőnyi, 2014), but also as a composite model, where not all supervision experiences are to be had 
with one’s own analyst. The dreaming-up of the patient taking place on the couch is only one of 
the varieties of supervision found in this model. Only one of the training cases is supervised by 
one’s training analyst, while others can be the object of “regular” face-to-face supervision with 
other analysts, or of group supervision/discussions. 
The second intervention happens around the boundaries between “analyst” and 
“supervisor”.  These boundaries can never be strictly concrete, but they are always unconsciously 
invested, in a way that includes multiple transferences and countertransferences. As Berman (2000, 
p. 276) argues: “We might think of supervision as the crossroads of a matrix of object relations of 
at least three persons each bringing her or his psychic reality into the bargain, creating a joint 
intersubjective milieu”. But this “at least three persons” often includes a fourth position, that of 
the analyst of the analyst. Even if we are situated within or without the Budapest model of 
supervision, we are just the same within this complex matrix of object relations: the matters of the 
“analyst in the supervisor” and of the “supervisor in the analyst” are bound to be of great 
importance.3 It is relevant to ask ourselves how these positions play out in the unconscious of the 
analyst in training. Furthermore, it is an illusion that countertransference work can be consigned 
to the candidate’s analysis (Berman 2000, p. 274). Assuming that it is possible to relegate 
countertransference work to the analysis and technical work on the case to the supervision is not 
an instance of good boundaries, but an instance of a defense by splitting which is written into the 
very dispositif of supervision.  
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The third intervention is one of situating the Budapest model of supervision in the context 
of the Budapest School’s wider explorations with countertransference. Notably, the practice of 
having one of the training cases supervised by one’s own analyst does not present itself to us as 
some abstract principle to be followed and not questioned, but it emerges as bound to experience, 
including the experience of the supervisor. In Vilma Kovács’s (1936) exposition, we learn about 
her difficulties in “orienting” herself in the material presented by the supervisees, in the situations 
when the presenter is not her analysand as well. As she writes: “I did not know the candidate’s 
character and his modes of reaction, and so I could not say from what point of view he was judging 
the various situations he encountered” (Kovács, 1936, p. 352). In Kovacs’s experience, 
“Analysenkontrolle” without “Kontrollanalyse” was superficial and unsatisfactory, because 
countertransference could not adequately be worked on by the supervision pair.  
It seems that the most important question of Budapest analysts was “what to do about 
countertransference?”. This question is equally present in Michael Balint’s explorations, in 
particular in his experiment with “Balint groups,” which has its roots in Budapest in the 1930s, but 
which he later developed in England in the 1950s (Mészáros, 2009, p. 217; Kutter, 2002). In the 
groups, medical doctors present cases that come with particular difficulties to them, while the 
leaders make interventions that are meant to create a psychoanalytic mindset, a psychoanalytic 
way of working on the cases, and stable modifications in the personality of the doctors and in the 
manner they approach the doctor-patient relationship.  
In Balint groups, the case is spoken, and the presentation is free-associative. In the groups, 
Balint insisted on doctors not using notes when making their interventions. When the case is 
spoken, and presented to the group, the basic assumption is that there is something yet to be 
uncovered. Neither the presenter, nor his peers, nor the group leader know exactly what is being 
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sought. Most importantly, comparisons between cases are comparisons between cases of 
countertransference. I believe that Balint, through his work with groups, was aiming to refine his 
understanding of and his vocabulary on countertransference. The intention was not so much to 
“apply” psychoanalysis outside its usual frame, but to design yet another “place” where 
countertransference could be observed. Balint (1970) made a direct connection between case 
presentation in the Balint groups and the Hungarian system of supervision: in both, the cases 
presented are treated as a “dream text”.  
The powerful question “what to do about countertransference?” partly explains our 
resistance in engaging the Budapest model of supervision, in its richness and its creativities. A 
complex context of forgetfulness, which I evoked above, is making the Budapest model ever more 
distant. In a recent paper Szőnyi (2014, p. 606) writes: “In 1987, Klára Ajkay conducted interviews 
among Hungarian training analysts about how they see the Budapest model. Unfortunately, this 
lecture, given in New York, remained unpublished”. We might wonder about the nature of this 
failure to inscribe in the public domain an archive of practices and experiences of a model that 
poses such difficult questions to us today. It has perhaps more to do with the psychoanalytic field’s 
reluctance to engage the specters of Budapest, rather than with the destiny of an individual 
unpublished paper.  
FERENCZIAN PRINCIPLES FOR SUPERVISION IN OUR TIMES 
Sándor Ferenczi did not leave us writings about supervision, but several of his papers 
(Ferenczi, 1929, 1932a, 1933) contain ideas on the epistemic status of psychoanalysis (what is 
psychoanalytic knowledge?); technical elucidations on transmission (through which dispositifs is 
psychoanalytic knowledge transmitted?); and ideas on the ethical position of the analyst (what is 
the position of the psychoanalyst in relation to knowledge and authority?). By examining some 
 
 12
Ferenczian insights that have direct relevance to supervision, we also place supervision firmly 
within metapsychology: our psychoanalytic knowledge about unconscious transmission and the 
functioning of dyads surely cannot be suspended when we approach the topic of supervision. (For 
a Ferenczian discussion of supervision see also Kupermann, 2018).  
In what follows, I show in which way a turn to Ferenczi’s metapsychology and ideas on 
technique helps us to develop new insights about the situation of supervision and to arrive at a 
paradigm of supervision for our times. I define “in our times” by a kind of binding commitment to 
examine the countertransference: whatever psychoanalytic “times” are yet to come, we must insist 
that they don’t turn away from more and more work dedicated to the understanding of 
countertransference. 
Ferenczi brings a useful complication to Thomas Ogden’s statement that “the supervisor 
helps the analyst to dream” and “It is the task of the supervisory pair to ‘dream up’ the patient, that 
is, to create a ‘fiction’ that is true to the supervisee's emotional experience with the analysand” 
(Ogden, 2005, p. 1265). In other words, the supervisor’s role is to help the supervisee dream the 
elements of his experience with the patient that the analyst has previously been only partially able 
to dream (their “interrupted dreams”, Ogden, 2004, p. 857), or has been almost entirely unable to 
dream (their “undreamt dreams”, Ogden, 2004, p. 857).  
A Ferenczian supervision, I argue, is one where a “double dreaming” or a “concentric 
dreaming” is taking place: a dream within another dream, or a dream dreaming a dream.4 The 
accent is thus on there being two dreams; and on the relationship between the dreams. This “double 
dreaming” means that the supervisor’s technique allows them to always hold in mind both the first 
dream (even if this is a “small” dream, or an “interrupted” dream, to keep to Ogden’s terms) and 
the second dream, emerging in the here-and-now between the supervisor and the supervisee. The 
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supervisor does not reduce the first dream to the second dream or vice versa; nor blend the dreams 
into a single master-dream where the original dreams become fused; but remains aware that the 
two dreams can interact in an intricate manner; and, it is also a part of the supervisory pair’s work 
to register these transmissions that take place between one dream and another. In contrast to 
Ogden’s image, we would not say that in supervision “an interrupted dream begins again” or “an 
undreamt dream is dreamt”, but that “a dream (or its absence) is being told within a dream”. As 
such, the supervision situation is always triadic and contains references to three presences (the 
patient, the analyst, and the supervisor) and to two acts of dreaming (the analyst is dreaming the 
patient; the supervisor is dreaming the dreaming of the patient).  
As soon as we settle this image of “double dreaming” in place, we can hold on to Ferenczi’s 
insights on power and authority in the analytic situation, so as to realize that this image is to a large 
extent an ideal. For Ferenczi, the horizontality of the analytic space, which he often mentions, 
especially in The Clinical Diary (Ferenczi, 1932a), is a constant aspiration and struggle, not a 
given. Horizontality is a verb for Ferenczi, and the analyst (supervisor) must constantly strive for 
it, despite hierarchizing impulses that come from their own unconscious, from the unconscious of 
the patient (supervisee), and from the very structure of the analytic (supervisory) encounter. In 
other words, just like the analytic situation, the supervision situation reconstitutes the originary 
situation of infantile obedience. Here, Ferenczi’s (1933) conception of the “identification with the 
aggressor” is crucial and his paper on the “Confusion of Tongues...” maintains its relevance.  
I would like to evoke here a lesser-known and earlier writing, titled “Taming of a Wild 
Horse”, where Ferenczi (1913) discusses the nature of authority and submission. In this short text, 
he offers a minute description of the actions of a “horse whisperer”, who manages a successful 
domestication of a wild horse. The key of this domestication is neither force and imposition nor 
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mild and gentle seduction, but a fast alternation between the two, capable of “breaking” the animal, 
by causing it an unbearable intensity and the confusion of unmet expectations, in terms of the 
registers of address (from love to dread, in a tight sequence) (Soreanu, 2018a, p. 64). The tamer 
seems to make precise tactical use of his knowledge about the effect of the juxtaposition of love 
and dread, and he first uses affectionate stroking and monotonous lulling talk, followed by 
authoritative and compelling loud-voice commands. Ferenczi (1913) calls the first tactic “maternal 
hypnosis”, and the second “paternal hypnosis”. With this complicated event of submission, the 
capacity for independent action is lost, and so is the capacity for doubt. The subject comes to ignore 
the validity of their own psychical and physical experience, and delegates judgements to an 
external force (Soreanu, 2018a, p. 64).  
Returning to the situation of supervision, my reading of Ferenczi’s insights on power and 
authority is that they point us to a key principle of supervision: above and beyond the mere 
transmission of technical psychoanalytic knowledge, the role of the supervisor is to watch over the 
re-emergence of scenes of infantile obedience and to watch over their own tactics of maternal 
hypnosis and paternal hypnosis in relation to the supervisee. The very fact that the supervisor is a 
different person from one’s own analyst is no guarantee that the inescapable issue of submission 
to authority will be handled in an adequate or creative manner. Furthermore, the idea that the 
problems of infantile obedience are in some way “reserved” to one’s own personal analysis, and 
therefore the supervision situation can be “free” from them, is just as anti-psychoanalytic as it is 
illusionary. It appeals to a way of transmission of knowledge that stands outside transference and 
countertransference, which is a psychoanalytic impossibility. Irrespective of the “model” of 
supervision that we are discussing, the question of the “supervisor in the analyst” and the “analyst 
in the supervisor” remains consequential. The struggles around maternal hypnosis and paternal 
 
 15
hypnosis (for both supervisor and supervisee) thus meet us as already “democratized” across the 
different models of supervision.  
In his 1948 paper on training systems, Michael Balint compared the atmosphere in 
psychoanalytic training with “primitive initiation ceremonies” (Balint, 1948, p. 167) having as 
their goal “to force the candidate to identify himself with his initiator, to introject the initiator and 
his ideals, and to build up from these identifications a strong super-ego which will influence him 
all his life” (1948, p. 167). To further explain his critique, Balint reminded us of one of Ferenczi’s 
innovative contributions to the understanding of a “mad” part of the superego, that is formed 
through processes of identification with the aggressor and through the incorporation of the guilt of 
the aggressor: “superego intropression” (Ferenczi, 1930, p. 227). I argued that this superego is the 
result of the introjection not of an object or of an aspect of an object, but of a scene. It is a superego-
as-a-scene (Soreanu, 2018a, p. 218; Soreanu, 2018b). This scene circulates in the psyche, 
incessantly replaying the violent encounter between an “over-great (fat) aggressor” and “a much 
smaller, weaker person, oppressed and dominated by the aggressor” (Ferenczi, 1930, p. 228). The 
context of supervision can be particularly vulnerable to scenes of “superego intropression”, where 
a “mad” and unexamined aspect of the functioning of authority (in the institution or in the 
supervisor) is pushed onto the supervisee, with greatly damaging consequences for the strength of 
their ego, for the severity of their superego, and for institutional processes and psychoanalytic 
transmission on the whole.5  
Given these challenges, what could constitute a horizontalizing intervention in the context 
of supervision? Ferenczi talks about “conviction”, which, as opposed to mere “belief”, cannot be 
derived solely through logical insight; instead, it needs to be lived as an affective experience, and 
even felt in one’s body (Ferenczi, 1912, pp. 193–194). Supervision is a space for the developing 
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of convictions, and not of beliefs. The supervisor’s intervention can be qualified as psychoanalytic 
knowledge if it can be lived equally as an intellectual, affective, and corporeal experience, in 
relation to the “dreaming-up” of the patient that the supervisee brings in the room.  
This takes us to another very important topic: that of regression in the frame of supervision. 
Several contemporary voices have discussed the way in which psychic phenomena pertaining to 
primary process manifest themselves in the supervision situation or can even be seen as inherent 
to the structure of the supervision situation (Cassorla, 2001; Doehrman, 1976; Frijling-Schreuder, 
1970; Yerushalmi, 2012; see also Bollas, 1987; and Spurling, 2008). While it would be impossible 
to review here all the contributions that Ferenczi brings to the topic of regression, I ponder on one 
of his lesser-known concepts, that of “gnosis”, which is connected to a time of “reliving” the 
trauma and to a return to a pre-traumatic time. In his writing The Two Extremes: Credulity and 
Skepticism, Ferenczi speaks of “psychognosis” or “gnosis”, which he sees as “the hope that it is 
possible, through an adequate profound relaxation, to gain access to a direct path to a past 
experience, which can be accepted without any other interpretation as being true” (Ferenczi, 
1932b, p. 263). Here, the pre-traumatic time and the post-traumatic time touch. “Psychognosis” 
does not mean direct access to the experience “of how things truly were”, but an effect of 
authenticity and an effect of veridicity (Soreanu, 2018a, p. 71). The post-traumatic state is, 
paradoxically, fuller in possibilities for enrichment and more radically relational than the pre-
traumatic state. In a similar way, the supervisor’s interventions can be neither “true”, nor “veridic”, 
nor “authentic”. To the extent that these interventions are managing to create an effect in handling 
difficult case material, they can also be judged to have created an effect of veridicity in the work 
of “dreaming up a dream” or of “double dreaming” that the supervision entails. In his short piece 
on “gnosis”, Ferenczi adds: “In fact there is in the end something that cannot, need not, and must 
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not, be interpreted—or else analysis becomes an endless substitution of emotions and ideas mostly 
by their opposites” (Ferenczi, 1932b, p. 263). The work of supervision is similarly exposed to the 
risks of overinterpretation and of the endless turning of ideas into their opposites.  
A final creative disturbance in the house of ideas on supervision, via the work of Ferenczi, 
relates to the notion of “parallel process”.  In the past few decades, instead of gaining more shape, 
this term has become somewhat flat, by being coded mostly via a system of projective 
identifications (Issacharoff, 1982), where, in short, the psychic experiences that the analyst has 
with the patient in the analytic frame are re-enacted between the analyst and the supervisor in the 
supervision frame. (For some key contributions on “parallel process” see Arlow, 1963; Searles, 
1955; Doehrman, 1976; and Ogden, 2005).  Ogden (2005) argues that a return to Searles’ ground-
breaking paper (1955) on the reflection process–which led to the formulation of the parallel 
process–might be a more fruitful starting point. As Searles describes it: 
The emotions experienced by a supervisor—including even his private, 
“subjective” fantasy experiences and his personal feelings about the supervisee—
often provide valuable clarification of [unconscious interpersonal] processes 
currently characterizing the relationship between the supervisee and the patient. In 
addition, these processes are often the very ones which have been causing difficulty 
in the therapeutic relationship. [...] The [conscious and unconscious] processes at 
work currently in the relationship between patient and therapist are often reflected 
in the [conscious and unconscious] relationship between therapist and supervisor 
[…] I shall refer to this phenomenon as the reflection process. (Searles, 1955, pp. 
157–59). 
 
If we remain faithful to the idea of the supervision space as “double dreaming” or the 
“dreaming up of a dream”, then it becomes clear that a focus on the re-enactment of the first dream 
in the second dream is one-sided. An insistence on the aspects of the analysis that are “paralleled” 
in the supervision might point to a resistance to elaborating the singular transference phenomena 
that take place in the relationship between the supervisor and the supervisee (Stimmel, 1995, p. 
609). This might mean that the tendency of the supervisor is to attribute the difficulties or conflicts 
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of the supervisory relationship to the patient, while treating the supervisory dyad as a reflection 
surface for the analytic dyad. As Berman (2000, p. 280) rightly points out, some aspects of the 
supervisory relationship are, simply put, “unparalleled”, while the deadlocks of supervision at 
times develop above and beyond any psychic phenomenon we might think of as “parallel” process. 
The Budapest School’s attention to countertransference (including the countertransference of the 
supervisor) leads to a special place given to these “unparalleled processes”, and, ultimately, to the 
radical singularity of each supervisory dyad.  
In a Ferenczian paradigm, the “double dreaming” of supervisory situation has radical 
potential, because it is at the same time a case of “double witnessing”. The supervisor is the witness 
of the analyst’s witnessing. The scene of trauma is thus addressed in a “double frame”, where the 
suffering that was denied recognition has the best chances of being acknowledged.  
VIGNETTE: WITH COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AT HEART  
In this vignette, we meet a supervisor and a supervisee who have worked together for six 
years, on four different clinical cases, out of which one was a training case. The supervisor also 
experienced the work of the supervisee in the frame of group supervision, for two years; and had 
good familiarity with the supervisee’s functioning in the institution. In one session, the supervisee 
arrives distressed by the intention of one of her patients to terminate the analysis. This was a 
severely traumatized patient whom the supervisee had been seeing for over two years, twice-
weekly. The analysis had advanced at a fast pace, it was very rich, and significant progress was 
made. The risk of a negative therapeutic reaction was present and acknowledged, as the patient 
had made a previous attempt to terminate the analysis. The supervisee was able to make suitable 
interventions in this first instance, and the patient continued the analysis.  
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In the supervision session, going over the details of the last session with the patient, the 
supervisee shared her great sense of loss and sadness over this potential termination. In a moment 
of heightened emotion, the supervisee says to the supervisor: “This was one of my most important 
patients, if not the most important, I’ve learnt so much with him.” The supervisor listens, pauses 
and asks the supervisee: “Do you read Thomas Mann?”.  The supervisee responds that yes, she 
knows the work of Thomas Mann. The supervisor continues: “In Thomas Mann, in The Magic 
Mountain, those whose tuberculosis is gravest are also the most important. They are the most 
valued.” The supervisee pauses as well. It is an intervention that is felt very strongly at the time, 
but that will also have significant and enduring effects in the supervisee’s clinical work.  
After the session, the supervisor’s condensed image becomes very generative, it is the 
source of various chains of association. But let us stay with the image of the hierarchy of illness in 
Thomas Mann. Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain [Der Zauberberg] (1924) is set in the years 
preceding WWI, from 1907 to 1914, in a tuberculosis clinic in the Swiss Alps. It spans seven years 
in the life of the protagonist, Hans Castorp, who ends up residing at the clinic. It also portrays 
seven years of melancholia, lived under the sign of death and disease. The melancholic temporality 
is exacerbated by the stultifying routines of institutional life at the sanatorium. A generalized 
malaise flows through and between patients, visitors and staff.  
At the sanatorium, people are no longer defined by their roles in the collective (as members 
of a family, or a professional organization, or a town, or a country), but they are classified in 
relation to their disease. This leads to a true hierarchy of illness, where the more severely ill 
command more respect and are more valued, which means that some patients exaggerate their 
symptoms. It is an entire social and psychic organization centered on illness. The sanatorium thus 
becomes a place for preserving illness rather than curing it. Hans Castorp arrives there as a visitor, 
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but he is readily seduced by the routine of life at the clinic and by the melancholic social 
organization it brings.  
Returning to the supervision frame, we can see that through a single intervention, the 
supervisor is able to point to an important impasse or blind spot in the countertransference of the 
supervisee, but also a potential impasse that affects the analyst’s clinical practice more broadly. 
Because of the scope and depth of their work together, the supervisor is able to point the 
intervention to the invisible space between the analyst’s cases. The supervisee’s comment, “This 
was one of my most important patients...”, triggers, by way of free-association, the supervisor’s 
evocation of the social organization in The Magic Mountain. The supervisor knows that the 
supervisee is justified in her clinical ambition to be a psychoanalyst of difficult cases. But the 
supervisor also knows that this comes with particular risks. The role the supervisor takes on in this 
instance is to challenge ossified positions in the countertransference, which are rooted in the 
analyst’s own complexes. This intervention would thus not be possible without having overseen 
the supervisee’s work over a good number of years and having seen the supervisee act in different 
clinical and institutional contexts. This type of knowledge approximates the type of intimate 
knowledge that Vilma Kovács was invoking in 1936 as crucial for maintaining a good direction 
for the supervisor’s interventions, in the context of her discussion on the Budapest model of 
supervision. While in our case the supervisor is not the analyst of the supervisee, as in the Budapest 
model, she intervenes on the basis of insights into the countertransference of the supervisee to her 
patient, which have been gathered over the years in different settings.  
The reaction on the part of the supervisee is powerful, and it leads not only to a better 
understanding of the countertransference of the case under supervision, but also to an insight into 
the supervisee’s clinical exercise on the whole. The supervisor did not wish to suggest that the 
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supervisee is melancholic, but, by using a hyperbolic image (which is part of her supervisory style), 
the supervisor drew attention to a moment of unconscious “inequalitarian” treatment of the 
supervisee’s patients and even to a silent “hierarchizing” of patients in accordance to how 
“difficult” they are or how much clinical challenge they bring. While it is crucial to work-through 
this danger constantly, it becomes stronger when we are the analysts of severely traumatized 
patients, who might call forth the omnipotent tendencies of the analyst, or the risk of a kind of 
furor sanandi.  
The supervisor’s intervention creates an intense reaction in the supervisee, precisely 
because it acts mainly by touching a blind spot in the countertransference of the supervisee, and 
not by instilling intellectual or technical knowledge. The supervisor’s intervention thus acts akin 
to an analytic interpretation. Its force lies in unconscious communication. This is also what 
constitutes its effectiveness. The supervisee later reveals that she often goes in her mind to the 
image evoked by the supervisor. The clinical work it enables surpasses the individual case 
presented on the occasion. After the supervision session, the supervisee feels that the relationship 
between her clinical cases has changed, and the vertical axis of illness which was threatening to 
act unconsciously so as to order her cases is now experienced more like a horizontalized plane, 
where every case occupies a singular space, and no patient is felt as “more important”. If we think 
about the countertransference to the difficult cases, the analyst had been too vulnerable to the 
demands coming from patients who manifest an unconscious wish to be treated like “the chosen” 
or “the favorite”. 
It is important to note that the supervisor’s intervention was drawing on a literary image, 
and not on a reference to a paper on technique. The supervisor free-associated with the material 
presented, and the couple of analysts at work found themselves for a moment in the Magic 
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Mountain by Thomas Mann. The supervisor found a way to point to a risk that affects all of us, 
with various intensities, in different moments: that of accepting the transference demand to 
melancholize the analytic space by adopting a too rigid position of “healer” in the 
countertransference. 
CODA: SUPERVISION FOR OUR TIMES 
What are we left with, after this incursion into the ideas of the Budapest School of 
Psychoanalysis? The first and most important principle (we may call it the “zero principle”) is that 
of proceeding with countertransference at heart: the countertransference of the analyst to their 
patient, but also that of the supervisor to the analyst; and particular ways in which they influence 
one another. This is the content of the more enigmatic formulation that supervision is a form of 
“double dreaming”. The first principle invoked above is that of avoiding the “superego 
intropression” (Ferenczi, 1930, p. 227), by arriving at a systematic way of addressing the problem 
of authority, which often takes the form of a sequence of acts of maternal hypnosis and paternal 
hypnosis on the part of the supervisor. The second principle is that of striving for walking the 
distance from belief to conviction, which includes a reception of the supervisor’s intervention that 
is in equal measure intellectual, affective or corporeal. The third principle is that of not shying 
away from the manifestations of primary process in supervision, and in particular from the specific 
forms of regression that the supervision context might entail. Here, Ferenczi’s (1932b) idea of 
“gnosis” is particularly relevant. The fourth principle firmly re-inscribes the idea of parallel 
process as a kind of “kaleidoscope” of the transference-countertransference system. Depending on 
which aspect of the process of the “dreaming of a dream” in supervision we might chose to focus 
on, the insights we arrive at are different. One of the most important things is to never reduce the 
supervision situation to a reflection screen of the analytic situation. Whatever mirroring system 
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might be in operation, it is bound to be a mirroring that has its own distortions, specific to the 
singular supervisory dyad we are considering. At the intersection of these principles of supervision 
what emerges is not the transmission of technical knowledge, but of the ethical posture of the 
psychoanalyst at work, always ready to consider the polyphony6 of transferential phenomena and 
the grounds of their own certainties.7  
From this perspective, it is an ethical imperative of every psychoanalyst, and of the 
psychoanalytic field on the whole, to keep investigating the specific content of any given law or 
rule, including the rules that organize the mainstream practices of supervision. As mentioned 
above, Michael Balint (1948) gives a very lucid account of the way in which a field of contestation 
on this topic was abruptly turned into a foreclosed topic. From the agreement, in principle, that 
work on the countertransference of the analyst must be inscribed in the system of 
training/supervision, the new London Standing Rules of 1947 practically banned the Budapest 
model, without finding other institutional solutions for the difficult puzzle of addressing the 
countertransference.8  
The direct consequence of this ethical imperative means a particular investment in 
“collecting” the most diverse accounts of how supervision is carried out, across psychoanalytic 
societies, orientations, and geographic locations. This is to say that our getting close to the 
Budapest model of supervision paradoxically leads us also away from it and invites us to take into 
consideration with equal interest other psychoanalytic houses and habits. What is called for is a 
nearly ethnographic sensitivity in collecting these polyphonic experiences of supervision across 
psychoanalytic cultures.  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in such ethnographic exercise, there 
are two directions which seem distinctly important in enriching our imaginary on supervision. The 
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first direction is understanding the place of group supervision in psychoanalytic training. Because 
of the multiple transferences at play, the group might provide meaningful answers when it comes 
to the question of de-hierarchizing interventions. Let us remember the “invention” of Helene 
Deutsch who introduced in the Vienna training a supervision seminar where two cases would be 
followed by the group over time: one case was presented by a trainee, while the other by and 
experienced analyst (Leader, 2010). As Darian Leader (2010, p. 230) stresses, this setting was very 
likely to challenge the ossified separations between analytic generations in a very creative way. It 
would have shown the trainees that the experienced analyst is also capable of committing errors, 
just as the trainee is capable of finding strikingly ingenious solutions to difficult clinical situations.  
The second direction is understanding the “life” of supervision in the life of the analyst. In 
other words, what are the ways in which analysts across psychoanalytic cultures transform the 
supervision of training cases in life-long supervision? De-coupling the way we regard the 
experience of supervision on the whole from the necessary connection with receiving an 
institutional confirmation would be a crucial step in giving the supervision context all the creative 
weight it deserves. While we might still hold different views on the issue of “analysis, terminable 
or interminable” (Freud, 1937) I argue that in the sphere of supervision we would be much profited 
by a statement akin to “supervision, interminable!”. It is a measure of the creativity of the analyst 
to organize a plurality of contexts in which they both give and receive supervision, as supervision 
is a privileged form of knowledge production in psychoanalysis, the only context known to us 
where we might be able to “double dream”. To not contribute in significant ways to contexts of 
supervision, as either giving or receiving supervision, is indeed a morbid act, or a de-libidinization 
of psychoanalytic transmission. 
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Thomas Ogden (2005) invites us to think of supervision as the space where the dyad at 
work has, at least occasionally, time to waste. Resonating with Ogden, I would say that 
complicated task of dreaming up of a dream, or “double dreaming” cannot possibly be met with 
time constraints or urgency. The dreamers do not know where the dreaming is heading, and 
therefore they do not know how long it will take (see Soreanu, 2016). Lisa Baraitser shows that in 
capitalistic times, the entire psychoanalytic exercise can be seen as anachronistic: a “waste of 
time”, a time that cannot be accelerated, cannot be justified, and “constitutes a dwelling in an 
indeterminate persistent situation that can be experienced as interminable” (Baraitser, 2017, p. 17). 
As Ogden (2005, p. 1272) writes: “This sense of having all the time in the world, of having time 
to waste, to my mind, is a necessary element of the emotional background for an important kind 
of associative thinking in the analytic supervisory setting.” 
Staying with the habits and thoughts of the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis performs 
an intervention in the complicated forms of forgetfulness that affect psychoanalytic history. I 
argued here that in the 1920s, something at the heart of psychoanalytic reflection on supervision 
was lost, never to be found again. Thus, the entire dispositif of supervision was formed around this 
fundamental loss. With the exclusion of the practices of the Budapest model, the challenging 
questions around countertransference, horizontality, authority, and ethics that it asked were 
excluded as well. In 1983, Paul Roazen paints a striking picture of the culture of secrecy that 
surrounds issues of training and supervision in psychoanalysis. At the International Congress in 
Innsbruck in 1927, Helene Deutsch had presented a paper on training and supervision, Sandor 
Rado had discussed the curriculum, while Hanns Sachs had spoken about training analysis. The 
discussion of these three papers, however, remained behind the closed doors of the International 
Training Committee (Fleming & Benedek, 1966; Roazen, 1983, p. 55), not available to the 
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psychoanalytic community, and none of them was published. With this failure to inscribe the trace 
of the content of our rules on what constitutes a good dispositif of supervision, the danger is that 
of a melancholic psychoanalytic culture, which does not know what it has lost.  
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2018). 
2 To put this idea in Ferenczian terms, we can refer to analysis as a “dialogue of unconsciouses” 
(Ferenczi, 1932a, p. 84).  
3 As Berman (2014) argues, there are certain degrees of overlap between the contents of analysis 
and supervision, which brings the need for a continuous exploration of their interactions, within 
analysis and often times within supervision as well: “Each candidate-analyst-supervisor triangle 
may arouse new meaningful issues and the significance given to the different figures may not 
match their declared functions” (Berman, 2014, p. 283).  
4 This formulation refers to the spirit of all Budapest School supervision practices, irrespective if 
the supervision is carried out on the couch or not.  
5 Other voices after Balint point to various aspects of the dangers of indoctrination, to the 
discouragement of innovation, and to psychoanalytic candidates developing an imitative and 
submissive “false analytic self” (Berman, 2014, p. 525; Kernberg, 1996).  
6 For a discussion on the space of supervision as a polyphonic space, see Safra (2018).  
7 For an exploration of supervision and ethics, see Dunker (2018).  
8 As Balint (1948, p. 166) argues: “Although eventually an agreement was reached that analysis 
of the counter-transference must form an essential part of the training, i.e. training analysis and 
practical work cannot be divided, no decision could be reached on the point whether the training 
analyst or another should begin the supervision with the candidate. There were strong arguments 
both for and against it. As the summary of the discussion at the second Four Countries’ 
Conference stated we shall need further experience before coming to any decision on that point. 
In spite of this, without any further published discussion the new London Standing Rules (1947) 
state: ‘The analyst undertaking the student's personal analysis does not undertake the supervision 
of his cases.’ So far as we know, this statement is not the result of carefully planned and 
controlled observations; it sounds to me like yet another dogmatic compulsory ruling.” 
 
